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The OpenFlow® protocol especially OpenFlow® Discovery Protocol (OFDP) 
utilizes clear text Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) message exchanges to discover 
network topology. Such exchanges lack security and may lead to network attacks such as 
LLDP flooding, link fabrication, etc.  Currently, the OpenFlow® protocol both in the case 
of discovery (OFDP) as well during subsequent communication between a controller and 
a switch (even with Transport Layer Security (TLS)) does not offer a way to understand 
whether or not a discovered controller or switch is a trustworthy device.  Presented herein 
are techniques that provide Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and blockchain-based trust 
establishment for OpenFlow® protocol communications that may be utilized between 
controllers and switches in multi-provider software defined network (SDN) deployments. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The OpenFlow® protocol is often used for communication between controllers and 
switches in SDN deployments.  For Topology Discovery, the OpenFlow® defined 
OpenFlow Discovery Protocol (OFDP) is used by controllers to discover the underlying 
network topology using clear, non-authenticated Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) 
packets.  LLDP is an open and extendable part of the Internet protocol suite used in IEEE 
802 to advertise the identity and abilities of the devices, as well as other devices connected 
within the same network.   
The OpenFlow® defined OFDP, however, is not a secure protocol.  While LLDP 
packets do carry information such as the chassis-id or system name, the protocol currently 
does not offer a mechanism to determine whether or not discovered devices are trustworthy.  
Further, the use of clear, non-authenticated LLDP packets to detect the links between 
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switches makes OFDP vulnerable to a number of attacks such as switch spoofing, link 
fabrication (e.g., LLDP duplication and LLDP injection), controller fingerprinting, LLDP 
flood, etc. 
One form of link fabrication may include packet duplication in which an attacker 
can gain control over a host connected to a switch, determine the Datapath ID (DPID) of 
the switch, and can fabricate a link by injecting fake LLDP packets into another switch.  
Another form of link fabrication may include LLDP injection in which an attacker, by 
monitoring the traffic, can obtain the LLDP content used by the controller, and can inject 
the same LLDP packets into the network thereby creating bogus links between switches or 
between the malicious hosts and switches.   
For controller fingerprinting, consider that LLDP content is different from one 
controller to another, which allows fingerprinting attacks on SDN controllers. For example, 
an attacker that has control over a host can match the LLDP content received from a switch 
(LLDP packets originate from the controller) against a controller signature database to 
detect which controller is managing the network.  Such information can then be used to 
launch specific and more efficient attacks on the controller. 
For switch spoofing, consider that each LLDP packet contains a version field, flags, 
Time-to-Live (TTL) information, and Type-Length-Value objects (TLVs) for information 
advertisement.  Mandatory TLVs in OFDP include ChassisSubtype (which may be the 
Media Access Control (MAC) address of the local port of the switch) and PortSubtype, 
which can be used to track packets by a controller.  By intercepting clear LLDP packets 
containing MAC addresses, a malicious switch can spoof other switches to falsify the 
topology graph of the controller. 
LLDP flooding is a form of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack in which an attacker 
generates enough fake LLDP packets to exhaust the link connecting a switch to a controller 
as well as the controller resources. 
Some current solutions for mitigating such attacks may include countermeasure 
methods to avoid these attacks, however they do not consider potential side effects on 
legitimate traffic flows.  For example, for link fabrication, one solution may include 
authenticating the LLDP packets by adding a key-Hash Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC) as an optional TLV in the packets.  However, this technique only works against 
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fake LLDP injection but not against link fabrication by packet duplication.  For LLDP 
flood attacks, basic countermeasure methods like port blocking or packet filtering may not 
be effective, especially in the case of very dynamic environments (e.g., multi-tenant cloud) 
since connected hosts and switches change frequently, which may result in preventing 
legitimate LLDP packets from reaching the controller.   
Also in SDN deployments, OpenFlow® communications are provided over TLS 
between controllers and switches.  When a controller and a switch establish a 
communication channel using TLS, they perform mutual authentication across a network, 
typically based on certificates or a public key infrastructure. However, this may be 
insufficient for cases in which a controller or switch may become compromised such that 
they are no longer a trusted entity.  As the OpenFlow® protocol is used during topology 
discovery as well as for configuration of policies etc., it is important to know that a device 
is trusted before involving the device in protocol flows. 
Currently, the OpenFlow® protocol, both in the case of discovery (OFDP) as well 
during subsequent communication between a controller and switch (even with TLS), does 
not offer a mechanism to determine whether or not a discovered controller or switch is a 
trustworthy device. 
However, trustworthiness of a controller and switch should be verified during 
discovery and subsequent communication between a controller and switch in SDN 
deployments. This includes an integrity check for both hardware as well as software for all 
the devices participating in OpenFlow® communications. 
Secure computing environments often provide that connectivity is only to be 
established with a trustworthy device. Thus, devices that are not trustworthy are to be 
excluded from network operations as early as possible in the overall operational process. 
In one implementation, trustworthiness of a device can be achieved through Attestation 
(Stamping). 
Attestation is a trusted computing technology which can be applied in hardware, 
software (applications), and/or protocols, especially in networking, and can broadly be 
divided into two Attestation methods including A) Bi-directional Attestation, and B) 
Uni-directional Attestation. 
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Trusted Platform Module (TPM) functionality can be embedded in a wide variety 
of devices including Mobile phones, PCs and Routers.  TPM functionality, also known as 
also known as ISO/IEC 11889, may be a dedicated cryptographic device that supports 
secure key generation and remote system attestation.  Attestation, as defined by the Trusted 
Computing Group (TCG), describes that the TPM functionality can be used as a hardware 
root of trust and offer Proof of Integrity of a node, in which integrity may include hardware 
integrity, software integrity, and/or runtime integrity. 
Neither blockchain nor trusted computing (TPM) alone may provide a sufficient 
level of network security for SDN deployments.  Blockchain is not an authentication 
technology (i.e., there is no authentication in blockchain), rather, blockchain is typically 
used for encrypting messages.  In a blockchain, data on the chain is 
unchangeable/immutable such that the ledger never changes (i.e., it is known exactly who 
sends data, but the data itself is not known).  Further, once a block is recorded on a block 
chain, it remains the same throughout time and is protected by mathematical algorithms. 
Blockchain is an append-only distributed database technology, also known as a 
distributed ledger. It allows a group of peers to maintain a database while guaranteeing its 
integrity and assuring that all peers have equal rights as far as owning, accessing, and 
managing the database are concerned.  From a data structure perspective, the blockchain is 
a singly linked list composed of structures called blocks. Each block, apart from the first 
block (the genesis block), points to the previous block in the chain. If any of the earlier 
blocks in the chain is tampered with, this change is propagated to every subsequent block, 
thus assuring detection. Each block on the chain has a unique address, timestamp, and 
relation with the previous block. This chaining mechanism also deters any adversary from 
changing a target (historical) block as then it has to modify all the blocks that were 
appended to the chain after the target block. 
It is important to understand that it cannot be proved that data that is written on the 
chain is the data that was intended to be written. Thus, it is cannot be determined what a 
device may write to the chain.  Stated differently from a security perspective, there is no 
evidence to identify how a private key may be protected on the chain.  If all that is present 
is the chain itself, it is difficult to identify the identity of a device that performed a 
transaction, whether it was performed by a trusted device or was performed by a device 
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that stole or borrowed the private key and performed the transaction.  All that is known 
that a device having the key performed the transaction. 
TPM provides Proof of Integrity measurement and assurance. Proof of Integrity 
measurement is not historical but related to the current state of either data or 
hardware/software.  Hence, along with Proof of Integrity, it is good to have freshness of 
Proof of Integrity by maintaining even historical integrity values that can easily be verified.  
For this, consider the following two conditions:  1) No entity should be able to change the 
historical integrity and records, and 2) all the information is going to be in the public 
domain.  These two conditions can be satisfied with blockchain.  Hence, what is needed is 
trusted computing (TPM) along with Blockchain to increase the level of network security. 
This proposal provides techniques to enhance security in multi-provider SDN 
deployments by integrating TPM and blockchain technologies into the OpenFlow® 
protocol for both topology discovery processes and also for subsequent communications 
between controllers and switches over TLS in SDN deployments in order to incorporate 
trustworthiness among participating devices. 
The techniques of this proposal can be divided into two parts, remote attestation 
and trustworthiness.  For the techniques discussed herein, the term 'device' may generally 
be used to refer to any of an SDN controller or switch. 
Figure 1, below, illustrates example details associated with remote attestation 
provided in accordance with the techniques of this proposal. 
 
Figure 1 
To facilitate remote attestation, various operations may be performed as follows: 
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1. At boot time, a device may compute a Measurement List (ML), which may 
include a hardware signature, a sequence of hashes of the software involved 
in the boot sequence, primarily the BIOS, the boot-loader, kernel, software 
implementing the platform, etc. The ML may also be used to capture the 
device system states.  
2. The ML (containing sequence of measurements) can be stored in a set of 
registers called Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs).  In particular, the 
ML can be securely stored in the PCRs inside the local TPM of the device.  
3. To attest the device, a remote Attester challenges the device with a nonce 
"nU." The device queries the local TPM to create a message containing both 
the ML and the “nU” and sign the message with a private key Attestation 
Identity Key (AIK) of local the TPM.  Generally, the AIK is a signing key 
provided and certified by the TPM owner that can be used to sign PCR 
quotes and certify other keys loaded into the local TPM. 
4. The device sends this message to the remote Attester, which can verify the 
message using a corresponding public key with respect to the private key 
(AIK), thereby authenticating the device. By checking that the nonces 
match and the ML corresponds to a configuration that is deemed trusted, a 
remote Attester can reliably identify the device as a trusted device.  
a. Verifying that a message has a correct signature guarantees that it 
was produced by the TPM at some point in the past. Verifying that 
a correctly signed message includes the nonce guarantees that the 
message was produced by the TPM at some point after the 
attester/verifier generated the nonce, which can prevents replay 
attacks.   
5. The remote Attester can communicate with the device over secure channel 
with Public Key Cryptography. 
6. The remote Attester can also read the boot event log and fresh PCR values 
in the ML. The integrity of event logs can be validated by comparing the 
actual PCR values to expected values from the log. The integrity state of the 
device can then be evaluated (e.g., whether trusted firmware, boot loader, 
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and/or OS kernel are running on the target device).  The remote Attester can 
also set a policy around these measurements, and enforce, for instance, that 
an up-to-date kernel is running. With these measurements, any 
compromised device can be detected.  Thus, the remote Attester can verify 
that a received ML is fresh, genuine, and has not been tampered with. 
Once the device is verified as trusted, it can be added to the blockchain of trusted 
devices and thus, added to the distributed secure ledger.  With the distributed secure ledger, 
all the blockchain enabled devices would know the trustworthiness of all other peer devices 
before connecting to them. Here Remote Attester would do the functionality of Miner when 
compared with Blockchain. 
To provide trustworthiness for an SDN deployment, SDN controllers can be 
enabled with blockchain functionality and acts as a blockchain node.  The SDN Controllers 
may be provided with information regarding the trustworthiness of switches connected in 
the SDN deployment and/or the trustworthiness of other SDN Controllers in multiple 
provider deployments.  If SDN switches (or controllers) do not supports blockchain 
functionality, then a bidirectional Attestation method can be used to verify the 
trustworthiness of devices in an SDN deployment. 
Techniques herein provide for integrating the process of remote attestation into the 
OpenFlow® TLS handshake protocol, which can be achieved by modifying the client key 
exchange messages in the OpenFlow® TLS handshake protocol using keys and signatures 
generated by a local TPM so as to provide the required level of security and trust.  In one 
example, TLS 1.3 can be extended with a new ExtensionType as defined in 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.   
Figure 2, below illustrates example details associated with trustworthiness provided 
in accordance with the techniques of this proposal. 
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Figure 2 
To provide trustworthiness in accordance with techniques of this proposal, various 
operations may be performed as follows: 
1. An OpenFlow® TLS client (Attestator) "C" creates a non-predictable nonce 
"Nc" and sends it along with its identity to a server (challenger) "S". This 
message may be a client hello message as prescribed for the OpenFlow® 
TLS handshake. 
2. The server responds with a server hello message, which contains a 
non-predictable nonce "Ns" generated by the server and the certificate of 
server signed by a trusted certificate authority (CA) (e.g., SIG_CA(S, PKs)). 
This message may be a server hello message as prescribed for the 
OpenFlow® TLS handshake. 
3. The message that the client sends back to server may similar to the client 
key exchange message in OpenFlow® TLS handshake with the following 
modifications (as illustrated in Figure 2, above): 
a. The client sends a Measurement List (ML) along with the session 
secret encrypted with server's public key "PKs". 
b. The client owns a pair of public/private Rivest-Shamir-Adelman 
(RSA) keys, referred to as AIK keys, generated by the local TPM. 
The client also obtains an AIK certificate which contains the AIK 
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public key signed by a trusted CA. The client sends this AIK 
certificate to the server to authenticate itself. 
c. The client sends a TPM Quote response to the server. In order to 
obtain a TPM Quote from the local TPM, the client sends a hash of 
the two nonces and the session secret to the local TPM and requests 
a quote signed by the AIK. The local TPM returns the signature over 
PCR values and the given hash by AIK private key. 
d. The server validates whether the AIK certificate of the client was 
signed by a trusted CA and belongs to a genuine TPM. The server 
then verifies the freshness of Quote response by comparing a hash 
of the nonces and the secret with the signed hash.  Next, the server 
validates the integrity of ML by verifying the hash of ML against 
the PCR value in the signature. Finally, the server validates 
individual entries in the ML by comparing the hashes against 
acceptable values. 
4. If the integrity of the client platform is trusted by server in the above step, 
then the server and client continue to exchange messages according to the 
OpenFlow® TLS handshake protocol to establish a secure session. 
In summary, techniques of this proposal provide TPM and blockchain-based trust 
establishment for OpenFlow® protocol communications that may be utilized between 
controllers and switches in multi-provider SDN deployments.  For example, 
trustworthiness can be provided between controllers and switches during network topology 
discovery and/or between controllers when communicating in multi-provider SDN 
deployments. 
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